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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model with crime, di¤erential human capital,
credit market imperfection, and police spending to examine the role of the latter
in stabilizing shock arisen from formal educational quality uncertainty. Based on a
stylized parameterization, we nd formal and illegal human capital accumulation
to share a common cyclical property. There is a case for the use of a rule-based
approach to police spending as it smoothens out the uctuations arisen from formal
educational uncertainty, while contributing to a decouplingof the two types of
human capital. This nonetheless comes with a cost of greater propagation of
the nancial accelerator e¤ect due to credit market imperfection, and therefore
necessitates the use of a supplementary monetary smoothing regime to negate
these negative e¤ects.
JEL Classication Numbers: H39, H50, K42, E44, E61.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the contributions of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), the socio-economic
e¤ects of crime have been a subject of both theoretical and empirical investigations
by policymakers and economists alike. The macroeconomics literature on crime has
examined the economic costs of crime mainly in a growth context, and largely estab-
lished a negative crime-growth relationship over the long run (see, for instance, Imro-
horoglu et al., 2004, 2006; Goulas and Zervoyianni, 2015). These studies also investigate
and link crime to the di¤erent aspects of agentsdecisions and society, which include,
non-exhaustively, child-rearing time (Neanidis and Papadopoulou, 2013), job-search and
labour market institutions (Engelhardt et al., 2008), inequality (Kelly, 2000; Burdett et
al., 2003), and human capital investment choice (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Mocan et
al., 2005). Of note, the latter introduced a framework that di¤erentiates both formal/and
crime-specic human capital albeit not in a general equilibrium framework bringing
to light the intricate link between the two. However, the study stops short at exploring
the economy-wide implications of the crime-education nexus, hence neglecting a key as-
pect associated with human capital investment in most developing economies with low
educational attainment and high crime rate: private investment in formal human capital
tends to be uncertain, an aspect already implied by various studies dated back to Galor
and Zeira (1993).
Indeed, this shortcoming leads us to a general scarcity that remains in the exist-
ing analytical literature on macroeconomic analysis of crime: most models developed
are independent from monetary and business-cycle considerations, despite studies such
as Morrison et al. (2003) and Heinemann and Verner (2006) having documented that
crime brings about macroeconomic multiplier e¤ects and therefore, potentially greater
economic uctuations. Indeed, in both country-specic empirical studies (for instance,
Detotto and Otranto, 2012; Pinotti, 2012; de Blasio et al., 2016 for Italy) and in the
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sociological science literature in the tradition of Cantor and Land (1985), strong empiri-
cal links between business cycle uctuations and crime incidence have been established,
albeit using mostly atheoretical framework (see, for instance, Arvanites and Dena,
2006; Bressler, 2009; Bushway et al., 2012). To our knowledge, save for a recent multi-
equations model by Astarita et al. (2018), a rigorous analytical framework with Keyne-
sian features remains elusive, more so a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
framework of crime with business-cycle properties.
To preview, this paper develops a DSGE model in the broad credit market imperfec-
tiontradition of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999) to examine
the e¤ects of human capital investment uncertainty in an economy with crime, police
spending (generally, public expenditure on public order and security), credit market
imperfections, and monetary policy. The latter duo are common features in nancial
acceleratormodels, therefore allow for more realistic modeling of the impact of crime
on businesses and the wider economy, which in turn facilitate better understanding of
the macroeconomic stabilization properties of police spending, and how police spend-
ing interacts with the common macroeconomic stabilization tools. Indeed, given that
some of the economies with the highest crime rate in Latin America have experienced
decades of persistently high organized crime and monetary instability (see, for instance,
UNODC, 2012), there is a concrete policy need for such a model. This, together with
the well-documented uneven educational quality in the region1, suggest that the inter-
actions of crime and formal human capital investment have a much signicant e¤ect on
the e¤ectiveness of macroeconomic stabilization policies in these economies.2
1See, for instance, Agénor and Lim (p.34, 2018) for a discussion on the issues of overeducation in
the region. Despite that, on average, ve of the most developed upper-income economies in the region
still register a 79.5 percent of non-tertiary workforce, suggesting an overall uncertain environment for
the attainment of formal/legal human capital.
2According to Heinemann and Verner (2006) and Soares and Naritomi (2010), the non-homicidal and
non-domestic crimes in Latin America are predominantly urban crime, and a signicant proportion of
these criminal activities are of semi-organized nature that have adverse impacts on rms and production
activities.
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Indeed, the material costs of crime are estimated to add up to about 3.6 percent
of GDP for Latin America (Londoño and Guerrero, 2000; Jaitman and Torre, 2017).
Crime is said to consistently undermine business activities and therefore disincentivize
human capital accumulation (Ayres, 1998). For the latter, Londoño and Guerrero (2000)
estimate that the net accumulation of human capital in Latin America is half of what it
ought to be due to the prevalence of crime. This, and given that education expansion has
been shown empirically to have a crime-reducing e¤ect (Machin et al., 2012), further
reinforces the destabilizing impact of crime in the region. Indeed, it has been well-
documented that organized criminal activities represent a non-negligible cost of doing
business in the region, with the various downside risks resulting from organized crime
often contributed to low business condence, higher credit risk premium, and a greater
overall business uncertainty when compared to other regions (Aravena and Solís, 2009;
Spillan et al., 2014; Oguzoglu and Ranasinghe, 2017). All these create the needs for the
governments to not just spend more on police and crime prevention (Bourguignon, 1999),
but to nd ways in improving its e¤ectiveness. Indeed, according to Soares and Naritomi
(2010), small police force is attributed to be a key factor of the high crime rate in Latin
America. The relatively low level of government expenditure on public safety and small
number of police personnel are illustrated in Figure 1. With many governments in
developed economies, such as the United Kingdom, also currently debating on how best
to manage the specic spending on public safety/police, the various issues underlined
are well-worth examining.
Specically, we build on the monetary model of Agénor and Alper (2012) to exam-
ine the nexus between crime and macroeconomic stability by exploring the interactions
between organized crime and human capital (empirically well-documented in the Italian
Maa literature, but scarce in terms of analytical model). The nominal rigidities and
monetary features are therefore included by design, as these are well-documented to be
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the main drivers of the nancial accelerator e¤ect, which in turn a¤ects the real credit
cost the lending risk premium of which depends on crime rate faced by rms and
its propagation mechanism.3 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
2 presents the model. Section 3 denes and solves for its symmetric and steady-state
equilibria. In Section 4, the model solutions are then log-linearized and parameterized to
reect a typical middle-income Latin American economy with high crime rates. Section
5 discusses the policy e¤ects of the structural shocks introduced, especially on the role of
public security/police spending in managing the uctuations associated with formal hu-
man capital investment. Policy lessons drawn, together with future research directions,
conclude the article in Section 6.
2 The Model
A closed economy populated by a continuum of identical innitely-lived individuals,
indexed by i 2 (0; 1) is considered. Individuals consume, hold monetary assets, make
human and physical capital investments, and allocate their time, normalized to one,
among leisure, market works (Nit 2 (0; 1)), and criminal activities (it 2 (0; 1)). In
market works, individuals supply e¤ective labor hours (HYitNit) to a continuum of mo-
nopolistically competitive intermediate goods-producing rms (IG rms), indexed by
q 2 (0; 1), which supply the composite of intermediate goods to a nal good-producing
rm. In criminal activities, consistent with studies such as Gaviria (2002) and Blackburn
et al. (2017), these take a quasi-organized form that has e¤ects similar to imposing a tax
(extortion, if interpreted as heavy crime; or swindling of rmsresources, if interpreted
as corporate crime) on the production of the intermediate goods (IGs) and therefore can
3For readers who are not interested in examining these credit riskcrime nexus and instead only
want to focus on police spending, these features can be dropped from the model. However, the policy
realism of only having only police spending in an economy without monetary policy is minimal, and
therefore will not provide much concrete insights.
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be treated as a type of marginal cost to the rms.4 By investing and owning the physical
capital stock of the economy, individuals rent it to the IG rms, which in turn use it as
collateral for borrowing from a commercial bank. Each IG rm employs e¤ective labor
and physical capital, while incurring additional marginal cost due to crime, to produce
a perishable good, which is subject to the standard Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment
process. Each individual i owns an IG rm and therefore receives all the prots make
by that rm. For simplicity, we assume N qit = 
q
it = 0, which means individuals do not
work or commit fraud on own rms. There is full exibility to wages which adjust to
clear the labor market.
Individuals collectively own the commercial bank, which supplies credit at the pre-
vailing loan rate only to the IG rms to nance their working capital needs. The bank
also pays interest on individualsdeposits and the liquidity from a Central Bank. The
Central Bank supplies liquidity to the bank and purchases government bonds (BCt ), with
the corresponding liabilities being the money supply (MSt ) and required reserves (
t).
Monetary policy is operated by xing the renance rate (iRt ) based on a reactionary
Taylor-style (1993) policy rule, as in Liu (2006) and Agénor and Alper (2012). The
government purchases the nal good (GOt ) and spend on public order and security (G
P
t ).
These are nanced by taxing the income (both wage and capital income) of individuals
at a constant rate,  2 (0; 1), and the issuance of riskless one-period bonds, held by
individuals and the Central Bank.
Similar to market works, it is the e¤ective hours that count for criminal activities,
which is dependent on crime-specic human capital (HCt ), akin to a form of cultural cap-
ital. Unlike formal human capital, individuals do not have the choice to invest in crime-
specic human capital, in line with Mocan et al. (2005). Each period, crime-specic
4In practice, as described in Case Study-based contributions such as Aravena and Solís (2009)
UNODC (2012), the characteristics of organized crime in Latin America can be quite di¤erent across
the di¤erent economies, though a general specication is su¢ ce to capture their impacts on rms in the
context of this model.
6
human capital gains by an exogenous amount , but can be reduced by the governments
investment in maintaining public security (GPt ).
5 The probability of an individual es-
caping apprehension after committing a crime is given exogenously by { 2 (0; 1), in
line with most macroeconomic studies on crime.6 If caught, individuals ilincome is
conscated.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals i 2 (0; 1) derive utility from consumption (Cit), leisure, and a composite
index of real monetary assets (real cash balances, mit, and bank deposits, dit). They
solve the intertemporal optimization problem of maximizing
V it = Et
1X
s=0
s
(Cit)
1  1

1  1

+ N ln(1 Nit   it) + F ln(mHit )d1 it ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1),  is the constant elasticity of substitution,  2 (0; 1), and N ; F > 0,
subject to an end-of-period ow budget constraint of
MHit + Dit + B
H
it = Pt(rtKit + wtH
Y
itNit) + Pt[{HCit it(rtKit + wtHYitNit)] (2)
 Tit + iDt 1Dit 1 + iBt 1BHit 1 + J IGit + iJBit   Pt(Cit + Iit + IHit);
where rtKit + wtHYitNit is the total factor payments, rt the real rental price of capi-
tal, wt the economy-wide real wage, Tit = KrtKit + NwtHYitNit is the taxes paid to
5While the analytical specication is mainly adopted from the di¤erential human capital framework
of Mocan et al. (2005), the deep-rootednature of crime-specic human capital modelled is in consistent
with the Italian Maa literature, such as Coniglio et al. (2010) and Caglayan et al. (2017). In addition,
for the purposes of this article, police spending and expenditure on public order and security are used
interchangeably.
6For examples, see Imrohoro¼glu et al. (2004, 2006) and Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013). An
alternative specication is to provide the probability with an underlying distribution, and makes it
evolves according to transitional probabilities that are endogenous to GPt . We opt to treat G
P
t as a
more general expenditure that has e¤ects on crime-specic human capital (also interpretable as a sort
of cultural/social capital), hence encompassing more than just spending on police.
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the government, MHit = Ptm
H
it the nominal cash holdings, Dit = Ptdit the nominal de-
posits, BHit = PtB
H
it the nominal holding of government bonds by individuals, i
D
t 1Dit 1
(iBt 1B
H
it 1) the interests on deposit (government bonds) hold in previous period, Iit the
investment in capital stock, IHit the investment in formal human capital, J IGit the end-
of-period prots received from IG rms, and JBit (i 2 (0; 1)) the claim (fraction of the
prots) hold by individual i on the commercial bank. Individuals therefore hold nomi-
nal wealth in the form of nominal cash, deposits, government bonds, and real stock of
physical capital (Kit) in rm q = i.
The stock of physical capital at the beginning of period t+ 1 is given by
Kit+1 = (1  K)Kit + Iit    (Kit+1; Kit); (3)
where K is the depreciation rate of physical capital and  (Kit+1; Kit) the standard (in
the DSGE literature) capital adjustment cost,7
 (Kit+1; Kit) =
K
2

Kit+1
Kit
  1
2
Kit; K > 0: (4)
The formal and illegal human capital at period t+ 1 evolves according to
EtHYit+1 = Nt IHit + (1  L)HYit ; and (5)
EtHCit+1 =  Ct GPt + (1  C)HCit ; (6)
respectively, where L; C 2 (0; 1) is the formal, illegal human capital depreciation rate,
Nt ; 
C
t > 0 are the respective human capital investment e¢ ciency for private indi-
viduals and government common to all individuals, and  is a time-invariant additive
7This, together with the Rotemberg (1982) pricing introduced later, is incorporated as a generalized
feature of a monetary economy. Both can easily be dropped from the model by setting the adjustment
parameters to zero.
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parameter for crime-specic human capital (that adds to the overall stock in each period
as one continues to involve in crime), following Mocan et al. (2005). As novel features
that further contribute to their framework, both investment e¢ ciencies are dynamic pa-
rameters with both deterministic and stochastic components. Specically, investment
e¢ ciency of formal human capital is given by
Nt = 
N
0t(
HCt
~HC
) %N ; (7)
where %N  0, N0t = (N0 )1 &N (N0t 1)&N exp(Nt ) follows an AR(1) process, in which
N0 > 0, &N 2 (0; 1) is the associated autoregressive coe¢ cient, and Nt is normally
distributed with zero mean and a constant variance (2N). The issue of uncertainty in
formal human capital investment is explored in various macroeconomic studies in the
tradition of Galor and Zeira (1993), mainly in deterministic framework, where human
capital investment is endogenized to factors such as credit constraint and unobserved
income [see, for instance, Galor and Moav (2004)]. In an economy where crime is a
main part of economic activities, it can be argued that formal human capital investment
e¢ ciency is adversely a¤ected by the societys receptiveness towards crime, while the
stochastic component is similar to Agénor (2016).8
To model the link between relative deprivation and crime (Hicks and Hicks, 2014),
we utilize a scale e¤ect specication for the (cultural) crime-specic human capital
investment e¢ ciency,
Ct = 
C
0t(
t
~
) %C ; (8)
where %C  0, C0t = (C0 )1 &C (C0t 1)&C exp(Ct ), C0 > 0, &C 2 (0; 1), and Ct ~N(0; 2C).
8Alternatively, a partial-equilibrium job-search mechanism in similar vein of Burdett et al. (2003),
Engelhardt et al. (2008), Engelhardt (2010) can be introduced that posits human capital investment
e¢ ciency as being derived from a job-search process, the cost of which is adversely a¤ected by the stock
of crime-specic human capital in the economy. This then leads to a rst-order condition that is similar
to (??, at the cost of increasing the model size with very little gained in terms of what is not already
known in the existing literature. We therefore abbreviate this and use a seemingly ad-hoc feature.
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As such, while crime-specic human capital accumulation in itself is uncertain, the
relativity of the crime rate from a naturalrate implicitly reects the state of relative
deprivation in the economy, and therefore a¤ecting the e¤ectiveness of governments
crime-combatting measures.
Each household i maximizes lifetime utility by choosing Cit, Nit, it, mHit , b
H
it , dit,
Kit+1, and HYit+1, taking prices (and therefore ination rates, t+1 = (Pt+1   Pt)=Pt 8t),
factor returns, tax rate, iDt , i
B
t , and the crime-specic human capital levels, H
C
it 8t as
given. As shown in Appendix A, solving the intertemporal utility maximization problem
gives the following rst-order conditions for individuals:
Et(
Cit+1
Cit
)1= = Et(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
); (9)
Nit   it = (1  N){HCit
  rtKit
wtHYit
; (10)
NC
1=
it
{HCit (rtKit + wtHYitNit)
;=
NC
1=
it
(1 + {HCit it   N)wtHYit
; (11)
mHit =
FC
1=
it (1 + i
B
t )
iBt
; (12)
dit =
F (1  )C1=it (1 + iBt )
iBt   iDt
; (13)
Et(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
) = Et
(
1 + K(
Kit+1
Kit
  1)
 1 " (1 + {HCit+1it+1   K)rt+1
+(1  K) + K
2
(
K2it+2
K2it+1
)
#)
; (14)
Et(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
) = Et

Nt (1 + {HCit+1it+1   N)wt+1Nit+1

+ (1  L); (15)
Et

(1 + {HCit+1it+1)(Nt wt+1Nit+1  
rt+1
K
)  NNt wt+1Nit+1 + K
rt+1
K

(16)
=
(1  K)
K
  (1  L) + Et[0:5K(K
2
it+2=K
2
it+1)
K
];
where K = 1 + K(
Kit+1
Kit
  1), illegal human capital, HCit+1, being given by (6), and
the transversality conditions, lims!1Et+s
st+s(ht+s=Pt+s) = 0; for  = K;m
H hold.
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Without capital adjustment cost (K = 0), (14) and (16) can be written as:
Et(
1 + iBt
1 + t+1
) = Et[(1 + {HCit+1it+1   K)rt+1] + (1  K); and (17)
Et

(1 + {HCit+1it+1)(Nt wt+1Nit+1   rt+1)
 NNt wt+1Nit+1 + Krt+1

= (L   K): (18)
2.2 Final Good sector
The nal good, Yt, is produced by a zero prot-making, perfectly competitive repre-
sentative rm that assembles a continuum of intermediate goods, Yqt, q 2 (0; 1), using
standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) technology. Specically, the prot maximization problem
is given by Yqt = arg maxPtf
R 1
0
[Yqt]
(& 1)=&djg&=(& 1)   R 1
0
PqtYqtdj, where & > 1. For a
given IG price Pqt, yields the demand function for each intermediate good,
Yqt = (
Pqt
Pt
) &Yt; 8q 2 (0; 1); (19)
and the corresponding nal price, Pt = f
R 1
0
[Pqt]
1 &djg1=(1 &).
2.3 Intermediate Goods sector
Using constant returns-to-scale production technology, each IG rm q 2 (0; 1) employs
physical capital, Kqt, and labor (in e¤ective human capital-adjusted terms, HYqtNqt,
supplied by individual i, q = i) and faces the production function,
Yqt = AtK

qt(H
Y
qtNqt)
1 ; (20)
where  2 (0; 1), and At denotes a common economy-wide technology shock following
an AR(1) process, At = (A0)1 &A(At 1)&A exp(At ), where 
A
t is normally distributed with
zero mean and a constant variance (2A). Each IG rm q solves a two-stage prot maxi-
mization problem: a static unit cost minimization problem, followed by an intertemporal
prot maximization problem due to a Rotemberg (1982) style price-adjustment cost.
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Following Ravenna and Walsh (2006), IG rm q borrows from the commercial bank
to pay wages to e¤ective labor hours in advance. Let Lqt be the amount borrowed, the
nancing constraint is given by
lqt =
Lqt
Pt
 wtHYqtNqt: (21)
At the end of the period, the loan is repaid at a gross nominal loan rate (1 + iLqt).
In each period t, each IG rm q therefore incurs a cost of (1 + iLqt)wt for e¤ective labor
hired from a competitive labor market and the rate of returns, rt for physical capital
hired. In addition, consistent with the urban crime described in studies such as Londoño
and Guerrero (2000), each IG rm also faces extortions from criminals (the amount of
resources extorted depends on the e¤ective hours of crime, qtHCqt, committed by indi-
vidual j, q = j)9 at a constant probability V , hence incurring an additional production
cost, qtHCqt[wtH
Y
qtNqt + rtKqt]. This specication is also consistent with many organized
crime described in Latin America-based studies such as Gaviria (2002) and Gomez Soler
(2012). For simplicity, we assume V = 1.10 Each rm q therefore solves the unit cost
minimization problem,
min
Nqt;Kqt
(1 + iLqt)wtH
Y
qtNqt + rtKqt + qtH
C
qt[wtH
Y
qtNqt + rtKqt];
subject to Yqt = 1, taking wages, rate of returns of capital, and e¤ective of hours of
crime as given. The rst-order conditions derived in Appendix A. The implied physical
9We assume individuals neither work nor extort from the IG rm they own, Nqit = 
q
it = 0. Similarly,
we also assume that, while j belongs to the continuum i 2 (0; 1), i 6= j. In other words, an individual i
does not extort from the same rm he is working in.
10Such victimization probability can be referred to Imrohoro¼glu et al. (2004, 2006), though they
model crime as theft. In this article, we model crime as direct extortions from rms, as in Blackburn
et al. (2017). In stationary equilibrium, the victimization probability would then equal economy-wide
crime rate, ~. We abstract from this by assuming V = 1.
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capital-e¤ective labor ratio of each rm q is given by
Kqt
HYqtNqt
=

1  
(1 + iLqt + qtH
C
qt)wt
(1 + qtHCqt)rt
; (22)
where the marginal cost of both labor and physical capital includes the amount lost to
crime. Specically, from Appendix A, the derived unit real marginal cost is given by:
mcqt =
[(1 + iLqt + qtH
C
qt)wt]
1 [(1 + qtHCqt)rt]

(1  )1  : (23)
In addition to the marginal cost, each rm q also incurs price-adjustment cost due
to nominal price stickiness, which takes the form of
F
2

Pqt
(1 + ~)Pqt 1
  1
2
Yt;
where F  0 is the parameter measuring the degree of price stickiness and ~ is the
steady-state ination rate. With this, each IG rm q selects a sequence of prices,
fPqt+sg1s=0 so as to maximize the total discounted sum of all the rms real prots,
as in:
max
fPqt+sg1s=0
Et
1X
s=0
st+s

qt+s
Pt+s

; (24)
where the discount factor is the same as the individuals (since they own the IG rms)
and the nominal prots, qt, is given by
qt = PqtYqt   PtmcqtYqt   F
2

Pqt
(1 + ~)Pqt 1
  1
2
PtYt: (25)
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Substitute (19) into (25), the rst-order condition can be expressed as
(1  &)t(Pqt
Pt
) &(
Yt
Pt
) + t&(
Pqt
Pt
) & 1
Ytmcqt
Pt
(26)
 tF
8><>:

Pqt
(1+~)Pqt 1
  1

 Yt
(1+~)Pqt 1
9>=>;+ FEt
8><>: t+1

Pqt+1
(1+~)Pqt
  1

( Pqt+1
(1+~)P 2qt
)Yt+1
9>=>; = 0;
which, in the absence of price stickiness (F = 0), is merely a simple mark-up pricing of
Pqt =
&
&   1mcqtPt: (27)
2.4 Commercial Bank
The commercial bank receives deposits, Dt =
R 1
0
Ditdi from individuals and use them to
nance the credit to the IG rms. The supply of loans is assumed to be perfectly elastic
and collectively, the total loans equal Lt =
R 1
0
Lqtdq = PtwtH
Y
t Nt, where Nt =
R 1
0
Nitdi
and HYt denotes the economy-wide average legal human capital level. The bank also
holds required reserves with the central bank, t = Dt, which is a fraction of its
deposits, with  2 (0; 1) denotes the reserve requirement ratio. For a given level of Lt,
t, and Dt, the bank also borrows from the central bank, LBt , to cover for any nancing
shortfall. At the end of each period, it repays the central bank at a nominal renance
rate, iRt .
To determine the borrowing from central bank, we use the commercial banks balance
sheet:
LBt +Dt = t + Lt; or equivalently, L
B
t = Lt   (1  )Dt: (28)
The deposit and loan rates are set by the bank, so as to maximize prot, Bt , as in
max
iDt ;i
L
qt
Bt = qi
L
qtLt(i
L
qt) + (1  q)(PtKqt   )  iDt Dt   iRt [Lt(iLqt)  (1  )Dt];
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where q is the repayment probability. Solving this yields the rst-order conditions:
iDt = (1 +
1
D
) 1(1  )iRt , and iLqt = (1 +
1
L
) 1
iRt
q
; (29)
where D = [@Dt=@i
D
t ]  (iDt =Dt) > 0 and Lq = [@Lt=@iLqt]  (iLqt=Lt) < 0 are the interest
elasticity of deposit supply and the interest elasticity of loan demand respectively. The
latter is conceptually speaking di¤erent for each IG rm q, but can be assumed to be
the same across the rms in the symmetric equilibrium examined later.
Assuming the supply of deposit is perfectly elastic (D assumes a large value), the
optimal deposit rate, iDt , is then:
iDt = (1  )iRt : (30)
As argued in Agénor and Montiel (2008), the repayment probability generally in-
creases with the collateral provided, PtKqt,  2 (0; 1), as a percentage of the loan
taken out by rms. In addition, in line with the thesis of crime being extortion on
rms, we also specify it to depend negatively on a macro-environment factor, in the
form of the economy-wide crime rate, t, in consistent with Baumann and Friehe (2017).
The repayment probability therefore takes the form of q = q0[1 + 	qt(PtKqt=Lqt; t)] 1,
which, combined with (29), yields
iLqt = (1 +
1
Lq
) 1q 10 [1 + 	qt(PtKqt=Lqt; t)]i
R
t ;
where 	qt > 0, 	
0
qt(PtKqt=Lqt) < 0, 	
0
qt(t) > 0 is the risk premium the bank charges
on its lending to rms. Specically, if 	qt = 	0(PtKqt=Lqt) 1(t)2 , 	0; 1; 2  0, we
have
iLqt = (1 +
1
Lq
) 1q 10 [1 + 	0(
PtKqt
Lqt
) 1(t)2 ]iRt ; (31)
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At the end of the period, the commercial bank makes a net prot of
JBt = (1 + i
L
qt)Lt   (1 + iDt )Dt   (1 + iRt )LBt ; (32)
which are paid in equal shares to the individuals.
2.5 Central Bank
The central bank sets the monetary policy. It holds government bonds, BCt , and loans to
the commercial bank, LBt , as assets. Its liabilities consist of the currency, M
S
t , and the
required reserves, t = Dt. From the balance sheet of the central bank, the currency
in circulation can be determined as:
MSt = L
B
t +B
C
t   Dt: (33)
The net income made on loans to the commercial bank is transferred to the govern-
ment at the end of each period.
The monetary policy is operated by xing the renance rate, iRt , assumed to be
determined by a Taylor-type (1993) policy rule. The linearized form is given by
iRt = t(i
R
t 1)
$[(~r + ~)(
1 + t
1 + T
)1(
Yt
~Y
)2 ]1 $; (34)
where t denotes another structural shock with an AR(1) process, t = (0)1 &M (t 1)&M exp("t),
where "t is normally distributed with zero mean and a constant variance (
2
M) (see
Rudebusch (2006)). The specication is in line with the empirical nding of Moura and
Carvalho (2010), in that monetary policy-setting in developing economies tend to be
reactionary. Likewise, the introduction of a source of random shock to the interest rate-
setting is in consistent to the speed limitpolicy approach introduced in Liu (2006) and
16
Agénor and Alper (2012), and reinforces the reactionary nature of the characteristics of
monetary policy in developing economies.
2.6 Government
The government issues nominal riskless one-period bonds to the central bank and indi-
viduals. It also taxes both labor and capital income at a constant rate, Tit = KrtKit +
NwtH
Y
itNit. The government also receives the illegal income conscated from success-
fully apprehending a criminal, and the net income (iRt Lt and i
B
t 1B
C
t 1) transferred from
the central bank. These are used to nance the purchases of nal good (GOt ) and an
investment expenditure on improving public order and security (GPt ).
11 The budget
constraint is given by
Pt[(1  {)HCit it(rtKit + wtHYitNit)] + PtTit +BHt +BCt (35)
= (1 + iBt 1)(B
H
t 1 +B
C
t 1) + Pt(G
P
t +G
O
t )  iRt Lt   iBt 1BCt 1:
Government purchases are assumed to be a constant fraction of output, hence GOt =
OYt, O 2 (0; 1). The expenditure on public order and security, GPt , is the novel feature
whose properties is examined in this article. For the benchmark case, we assume GPt
to be set also at a constant fraction of output, GPt = PYt, where the spending share
P 2 (0; 1) is chosen at the discretion of the government. For comparison, we also
consider a case that is rule-based, where GPt = G
P
0 (
t
~
) 1 ;  1  0; which essentially turns
the expenditure on public order and security to a reaction function that depends on the
relative crime rate, t, from its steady-state value.
11It is debatable whether the expenditure on improving public order and security is treated as a
consumption or investment expenditure. Given our specication where it contributes to the de-
accumulationof crime-specic human capital, it is akin to a type of investment expenditure.
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3 Symmetric and Steady-state Equilibrium
Denition 1: A symmetric equilibrium is where all individuals and all IG rms are
identical. This means, for all individuals i 2 (0; 1), Cit = Ct, it = t, Nit = Nt,
Kit = Kt, Iit = It, IHit = IHt, MHit = M
H
t , B
H
it = B
H
t , Dit = Dt, Kit = Kt. For
all IG rms q 2 (0; 1), Pqt = Pt, mcqt = mct, Kqt = Kt, Nqt = Nt, qt = t. All
individual and aggregate behaviors are consistent, which means all individual- and rm-
specic human capital equal the economy-wide average level of human capital, that is,
HY't = H
Y
t , H
C
't = H
C
t , where ' = i; q. All rms produce the same output and prices
and marginal costs are the same across rms. By implications, the loan rate, iLqt, and the
interest elasticity of loan demand, Lq , and the risk premium are the same across rms,
iLqt = i
L
t , Lq = L, 	qt = 	t, 8q. From (25), real prot of a representative IG rm is
therefore (1 mct)Yt  0:5F [1=(1 + ~)  1]2, with ~ denoting the steady-state ination
rate. These would also allow us to simplify the rst-order condition of the intertemporal
prot maximization problem of a representative IG rm, (26), to
(1  &) + &mct  F (1 + t
1 + ~
  1)1 + t
1 + ~
(36)
+FEt

1 + t+1
(1 + iBt )
(
1 + t+1
1 + ~
  1)(1 + t+1
1 + ~
)(
Yt+1
Yt
)

= 0:
The deposit, credits, currency, government bonds, and goods markets are in equilib-
rium. The supply of deposits by households and the supply of loans by the commercial
bank are perfectly elastic at the prevailing rates, hence the two markets are always
clear. For the currency market, the equilibrium condition is MSt = M
H
t + M
F
t , where
MFt =
R 1
0
MFqtdq is rmstotal cash-holdings. Assuming that the bank loans to rms are
made only in currency form, Lt = MFt , using (28) and (33), we can eliminate L
B
t to get
MHt +Dt = B
C
t : (37)
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Further, by using the aggregate expressions of (12) and (13), we can write an expres-
sion for the real value of central banks holding of government bonds:
bCt =
BCt
Pt
= F (Ct)
1=(1 + iBt )f

iBt
+
1  
iBt   iDt
g: (38)
Given this, and knowing that Pt=Pt 1 = 1 + t, using the government budget con-
straint from (35), we solve for the real value of the total stock of government bonds
outstanding, bt:
bt = (
1 + iBt 1
1 + t
)bHt 1 +
bCt
1 + t
+GPt +G
O
t   iRt lt (39)
 [(1  {)HCt t + K ]rtKt   [(1  {)HCt t + N ]wtHYt Nt);
with the individualsholding of government bonds determined by bHt = bt   bCt . Lastly,
the goods market equilibrium is given by
Yt = Ct +G
P
t +G
O
t + It +
F
2

1 + t
1 + ~
  1
2
Yt; (40)
where Ct =
R 1
0
Citdi, and It =
R 1
0
Iitdi is given by (3). For the benchmark case where
GPt = PYt, the aggregate resource constraint of (40) can be rewritten as(
1  (O + P )  F
2

1 + t
1 + ~
  1
2)
Yt (41)
= Ct +Kt+1   (1  K)Kt + K
2

Kt+1
Kt
  1
2
Kt:
Finally, note that (22), given Pt, can be used to determine both the economy-wide
real and nominal wages:
wt =
Wt
Pt
=
1  

(1 + tH
C
t )rtKt
(1 + iLt + tH
C
t )H
Y
t Nt
: (42)
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Denition 2: A steady-state equilibrium of this economy is a stationary symmetric
equilibrium in which, for a given set of parameters, a probability of escaping apprehen-
sion ({), and a set of policy arrangements f;  ; O; Pg: (i) the endogenous variables
( ~C, ~N , ~, ~MH , ~BH , ~D, ~K, ~HY , ~HC , ~BC , ~Y ) are constant8t; (ii) the prices, wages and
rates ( ~P , ~r, ~w, ~{B, ~{D, ~{L, ~{R) are all constant 8t; and by implications, (iii) the ination
(~), prots and marginal costs are constant 8t. In addition, in the steady-state, the
physical capital and goodsprices fully adjust, which means the relevant adjustment
costs equal zero (F = K = 0). The steady-state ination rate also equals its target
value (~ = T ).
We solve for the steady-state equilibrium in Appendix B. Without losing any gen-
erality, we solve for a simplied case where the ination target is zero. As derived in
Appendix B, we obtain the standard Fisher relationship, ~{R = ~r+ ~. When ~ = T = 0,
the steady-state renance rate (~{R) equals the real interest rate (~r), which in this mone-
tary economy with credit nancing and criminal extortions, is negatively dependent on
the steady-state level of e¤ective crime rate ( ~HC~):
~r =
 1   (1  K)
(1 + { ~HC~   ) : (43)
In turn, the steady-state crime rate, ~, is determined by:
~ = ({ ~HC) 1
"
(L   K)
( ~N ~w ~N   ~r) +
~NN ~w ~N
( ~N ~w ~N   ~r)  
K~r
( ~N ~w ~N   ~r)
#
; (44)
which depends on the e¢ ciency of investment in legal human capital (~N), the wage rate
( ~w), real interest rate (~r), tax rates (N , K), and the di¤erence between the depreciation
rate of human and physical capital (L K). If ~NN ~w ~N = K~r, then the assumption
of L > K is needed to ensure positive crime rate in the steady state.
In the steady-state, crime-specic human capital ( ~HC) is a function of the steady-
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state value of government spending on public order and security, and the corresponding
spending e¢ ciency in reducing crime-specic (cultural) human capital. Also, when ~ =
0, the steady-state gross rate of return for government bonds equals the rate of time
preference,1 + ~{B = 1

, which then determines the steady-level of real currency- and
deposit-holdings of individuals.
For the steady-state solutions to be properly dened, as in when individuals hold
~d  0 of real deposits, given that ~{D = (1   )~r, we must have ~r < (1   )=(1   ).
Without price-adjustment cost, the marginal cost of IG rms in the steady state, even
when there is non-zero cost arisen from criminal extortions, is equal to the standard
mark-up condition of monopolistically competitive rms, fmc = & 1
&
. The equations
for other endogenous variables can be referred to in Appendix B. In summary, the
simultaneous equations system characterizing the steady-state equilibrium of this model
is consisting of 18 endogenous variables in real terms (~r, ~{B, ~{D, ~{L, ~w, ~HY , ~HC , ~N , ~,
~mH , ~d, ~l, ~Y , ~K, ~bH , ~bC , ~C, ~GP ). Given the presence of the four stochastic shocks, to
solve the model, we log-linearize the behavioral equations and the aggregate resource
constraints around the non-stochastic, zero-ination steady state.
4 Illustrative Parameterization
It is well-documented that the quality of crime data is generally poor, even for the well-
used dataset of United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal
Justice Systems (UN-CTS). This is especially true for Latin America, where under-
reporting of crime remains prevalent (Fajnzylber et al., 1998; Rubio, 2000; Jaitman and
Torre, 2017). This, coupled with the non-availability of quarterly data for variables such
as human capital and time allocation, means a Bayesian estimation strategy is imprac-
tical. Against this backdrop, we calibrate the model with empirical parameterization
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using available statistics (as much as possible), so as to calibrate illustratively a typical
middle-income Latin American economy where crime remains prevalent. Unless speci-
ed otherwise, all calibrations are implemented to obtain initial steady-state values for
the endogenous variables that match the rst moment of the long-term averages of the
21 non-British caribbean, Latin American economies for the period 1991-2016.12
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1. Given the annual time frequency
and developing country context, the discount factor is set at  = 0:952, which corre-
sponds to an annual interest rate of 5 percent. With ~{B = 1

  1 in steady state, we have
the steady-state bond rate, ~{B = 0:05. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ,
and the preference parameter for leisure, N , are set at 0:6 and 1:75 respectively, con-
sistent with the values commonly used for the Latin American economies (see Agénor
and Montiel, 2015). The preference parameter for composite monetary assets, F , is
set at a very low value of 0:02 to reect a low utility derived from holding monetary
assets (given that criminal activities provide an alternative outlet to generate income),
which coincides with the value used in Agénor et al. (2014). The share parameter in the
index of money holdings, , is set at 0:2, which is based on the estimated cash-deposit
ratio for our sample economies. For convenience, we set both the tax rates to be equal,
K = N = 0:2, in the benchmark case, which is within range of the average marginal
income tax rates for our sample economies.
In terms of the initial steady-state values for the time allocation variables, a stan-
dard 8 hours of formal market work would give ~N = 8=24 = 0:33. The time allocated to
criminal activities (~) has to be estimated. Based on the methodology of Neanidis and
Papadopoulou (2013), we estimate ~ based on average crime incidence for our sample
economies using the UN-CTS dataset, which yields approximately 0.167 (per 100,000
12These include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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inhabitants). We therefore set ~ = 0:167. The exogenous probability of escaping appre-
hension, {, is set at 0:7, which is consistent with the UN-CTS dataset-based estimates
of Neanidis and Papadopoulou (2013) and Jia et al. (2018). Using the IMF Government
Financial Statistics, we can easily calculate the constant parameters for expenditure on
public order and security (P ) and other government consumption (O). For our sample
Latin American economies, we have P = 0:0157 and O = 0:167.
Next, we consider human capital. Following Mocan et al. (2005), we set the depre-
ciation rate for both types of human capital, L = C = 0:05. The calibration of the
remaining parameter, , as well as the determination of the two time-varying endoge-
nous human capital investment e¢ ciency values (~N and ~C) are as follows. First, to
satisfy L > K , we assume physical capital has a lower depreciation rate than human
capital, and set K = 0:02 (a value in line with Agénor et al. (2014)). Given this and
other parameter values, from (43), we can determine the value of the composite term,
{ ~HC~ = 1:4. With { = 0:7 and ~ = 0:167, the steady-state level of crime-specic
human capital, ~HC = 5:133. From (44), by normalizing the steady-state wage rate to
unity, ~w = 1, the e¢ ciency of investment in legal human capital is then calculated,
N0 = 0:215. For crime-specic human capital, we set the investment e¢ ciency to be
twice of N0 , where 
C
0 = 0:43. The time-invariant additive parameter of crime-specic
human capital, , is therefore 0:258.
Next, we consider the production side. The parameters in the production function,
(20), is parameterized in the standard manner, in that, the share of physical capital,
 = 0:35, and share of e¤ective labor, 1   = 0:65, are based on the production shares
of the respective input. The average productivity parameter, A, is normalized to one,
as in Tayler and Zilberman (2016). From IMF Capital Stock Database, the average nal
output-to-physical capital ratio of our sample economies is 0:451. From Appendix B, we
know that ~r =  ~Y
(1+~ ~HC) ~K
( & 1
&
), which then allows us to calculate the elasticity of demand
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for intermediate goods, & = 2:43, implying a high mark-up rate of 70 percent. This is
relatively high but does illustrate a case where rms would need a higher mark-up in
the presence of additional cost associated with illegal extortions.
In terms of the parameters characterizing commercial bankslending, following Agénor
and Alper (2012), we set the e¤ective collateral-loan ratio,  = 0:2, and the elasticity of
the risk premium with respect to collateral, 1 = 0:05. We also set the elasticity of the
risk premium with respect to the economy-wide crime rate to be the same, 2 = 0:05.
For the other parameters, rst, from the World Bank World Development Indicators,
note that the average lending interest rate for our 21 sample economies during the pe-
riod 1991-2016 is 22 percent, while the average risk premium on lending is 17:2 percent.
Using the steady-state relationship, ~{L = (1 + 1
Lq
) 1q 10 [1 + 	0(
 ~K
~l
) 1(~)2 ]~r, assum-
ing Lq = 1, base repayment probability, q0, of 0:2, and given the initial values of the
endogenous variables, the risk premium parameter, 	0, is calculated to be 0:815.
For the central bank, we follow Agénor and Alper (2012) and Agénor et al. (2014) by
setting initial reserve requirement ratio, , to a relatively low rate of 10 percent. Given
this, and that ~{D = (1   )~r, we have the steady-state deposit rate, ~{D = 0:045. For
the monetary policy, the smoothing parameter is set at $ = 0. We also set 1 = 1:5
and 2 = 0:2, which is consistent with Liu (2006) and Moura and Carvalho (2010).
The latter, "2, in particular, is consistent with evidence reported for several countries in
Latin America. For the rule-based specication for public expenditure on public order
and safety, (??), the parameter,  1, which models the responsiveness of the spending
with respect to a deviation in crime rate from its steady state, is set at 0:1. Finally, for
the stochastic shocks, we specify all four as rst-order autoregressive processes with a
common degree of persistence, &A = &M = &C = &N = 0:8.
24
5 Policy Experiments
As alluded, our main objective involves examining how the approach to macroeconomic
stabilization would di¤er in an economy with crime and formal educational quality un-
certainty.13 Given the intricate relationship between the two, we also explore for any
potential role of police spending in stabilization. First, we consider a temporary shock to
formal human capital investment, or specically, a 10 percent standard deviation shock
to Nt . From (7), this reects a quality uncertainty to householdsinvestment in formal
human capital, albeit an upside shock. The impulse responses are presented in Figure
2, which in addition to the benchmark, also illustrates scenarios of (i) an economy with
less crime (household spend 5 percent less of their time in criminal activities, ~ = 0:117),
(ii) higher (quadruple) base e¢ ciency level of formal human capital investment, N0 , and
(iii) a higher (double) initial share of spending on public order and safety, P .
As expected, we see that formal market works and formal human capital level re-
spond positively, which in turn leads to higher production and consumption. With the
temporary uptick in investment e¢ ciency, individuals reduce their asset-holdings, in-
cluding government bonds, and invest more in human capital. The expansionary e¤ects
on production also result in greater opportunities for extortions, which translate to a
general equilibrium e¤ect of a higher level of crime-specic human capital. In compar-
ison to an economy with lower steady-state crime rate, we see that the procyclicality
e¤ect on formal human capital, market works, and output is lower. In other words, the
initial level of crime reduces the procyclicality e¤ect of formal human capital investment,
with slightly higher degree of persistence in the response of output and ination. In fact,
a positive shock to formal human capital investment e¢ ciency also raises the level of
13Indeed, a quick deterministic analysis of a steady-state increase in the share of police spending,
P , will lead to higher levels of formal human capital, nal output, consumption, and lower level of
crime-specic human capital in the new steady state. These therefore rea¢ rms the long-run positive
e¤ects of police spending commonly documented in the literature. The results of this analysis is not
presented to save space.
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illegal human capital, and this co-movement appears to be independent of the initial
level of police spending. This co-movement appears to partly explain the experience
in some Latin American economies over the past decades: In spite of increasing policy
e¤orts in promoting formal education, crime rate appears to persist.
Next, we explore the role of police spending further. Suppose for the same temporary
Nt shock, we undertake a standard rule versus discretionexercise by comparing the
impulse responses of the benchmark model (discretionary approach to police spending by
setting P ) and the model with reactionary rule. These, together with selected sensitivity
analysis scenarios, are presented in Figure 3. While Figure 2 initially suggests that
the initial level of police spending is immaterial in curbing the accumulation of crime-
specic human capital, we notice in Figure 3 that the use of a spending rule signicantly
increases its policy e¤ectiveness. Indeed, when compared to a discretionary allocation
tied to the output level, the presence of a reactionary rule reduces the cyclical e¤ects
associated with the uctuation in educational quality, while gaining more in formal
human capital investment, formal works, output and consumption over a longer period.
These, coupled with the de-couplingof the shocks inuence on illegal human capital,
suggest a potentially useful rule-based approach to police spending allocation, especially
in an economy with signicant organized crime and educational quality uncertainty.
Next, we examine the model properties by stimulating a temporary 10 percent struc-
tural shock in increasing the e¤ectiveness of expenditure on police spending, Ct . The
impulse responses for both the benchmark and rule-based specication, along with the
sensitivity analysis scenario of a higher base e¢ ciency (C0 ), are presented in Figure 4.
Unlike the marked di¤erence observed for the Nt shock in Figure 3, the policy e¤ects
for this specic shock are numerically insiginicant. This is likely due to the unit of
measurement of crime rate being small, t 2 (0; 1), which as a ratio to its steady state,
means any relative deviation will be small. In the absence of a very large  1 elasticity
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value, the responses of other variables are therefore small. Nevertheless, within this con-
text, we still nd consistency to previous results, in that, the e¢ ciency and the level of
the expenditure have very small e¤ect in curbing accumulation of illegal human capital,
though the greater stabilization properties of a rule-based approach can negate this to
an extent.
Based on the two structural shocks considered, while the di¤erence appears to be
trivial if we only concern about uctuations in the e¢ ciency of the specic spending, a
policy rule to police spending allocation can have a stabilization role if the policymaker
is concerned about smoothing the e¤ects of shocks arisen from formal educational uncer-
tainty, while simultaneously achieving a de-couplingof the shocks positive inuence
on illegal human capital accumulation.
To examine further the properties of the rule-based approach to police spending, we
study the remaining two shocks (monetary and productivity), with the impulse responses
illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6. In Figure 5, we observe the well-documented
nancial acceleratore¤ect, where credit imperfection in the model causes the impact
of monetary shocks on prices to magnify. While a rule-based approach to police spending
remains e¤ective in de-coupling the illegal human capital accumulation process from
the procyclical formal human capital, it appears to exacerbate the nancial accelerator
e¤ect, in that the response of prices to the monetary shock is greater beyond the initial
10 periods, with the propagation process appears to have a greater degree of inertia.
Lastly, in Figure 6, when experimenting with a positive productivity shock, we ob-
serve similar patterns in the impulse responses. While a rule-based approach has better
output stabilization property in the short-term horizon (rst 20 periods) than even
some instances of conventional interest-rate smoothing regime, such a regime also im-
parts greater degree of inertia to the adjustment process. In the medium-term, it un-
derperforms conventional monetary smoothing. This suggests that, while a rule-based
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police spending might be e¤ective in supporting formal human capital investment (by
smoothing out the uctuation associated with educational quality uncertainty), as well
as decoupling the cyclical properties of formal and illegal human capital accumulation,
it comes at a cost of imparting greater inertia to the adjustment process. As such, in-
stead of replacing the role of conventional monetary policy, the use of a more systematic
reaction rule to police spending allocation in stabilizing shocks to formal human capital
investment would necessarily require a supplementary monetary smoothing to reduce
the adverse nancial accelarator e¤ect brought about by such a regime.
6 Concluding Remarks
We develop a DSGEmodel to examine the e¤ects of quality uncertainty in human capital
investment in an economy with crime, di¤erential human capital, police spending (gen-
erally, public expenditure on public order and security), credit market imperfection, and
monetary policy. The latter duo are common features in nancial acceleratormodels,
therefore allow for more realistic modeling of the impact of crime on businesses and
the wider economy, which in turn facilitate better understanding of the macroeconomic
stabilization properties of a policy such as the police spending. The model is parameter-
ized illustratively for a stylized middle-income Latin American economy where criminal
activities are a signicant part of society. The main innovation of our study is that we
explicitly consider the di¤erent potential role of public spending on public order and
safety, beyond its generally assumed function of crime reduction.
Based on our analysis, in a model economy with organized crime, the accumulation
processes of formal and illegal human capital tend to share the same cyclical properties,
hence contributing to the persistency in crime rate. In order for formal education to
achieve its desired role in reducing crime [as suggested in Pressman (2008) and Machin
28
et al. (2012)], there appears to be a need for the adoption of a rule-based approach to
police spending allocation. Such a policy regime not only smoothens out the uctuations
arisen from formal educational uncertainty, but also contributes to a decouplingof the
common cyclical properties of the two types of human capital. This suggests that, in an
economy with persistently high crime rate, a more systematic scal allocation to expen-
diture on public security/police may be warranted. Nevertheless, the use of a rule-based
approach does come with the cost of it imparting a greater degree of inertia onto more
conventional business-cycle shocks, and potentially worsening the nancial accelerator
e¤ect arisen from credit market imperfections. This means the use of a more systematic
reaction rule to police spending allocation in stabilizing shocks to formal human capital
investment would necessarily require a supplementary interest-rate smoothing regime to
negate these negative e¤ects.
For future research direction, we acknowledge the limitations of our analysis due to
the uneven quality of crime data. With longer time series, the heterogeneous nature
of the di¤erent Latin American economies can be accounted for by either Bayesian-
estimating our theoretical model, or evaluating the properties of the model solutions
in a DSGE-vector autoregression (DSGE-VAR) examination. In terms of theoretical
modeling, it is also worth pointing out that neither the issue of income inequality nor
other demographic factors known to cause violent crime are explored (see, for example,
Fajnzylber et al., 2002). These are issues worth-exploring in further theoretical studies,
perhaps in a model without the credit and monetary features introduced in this study.
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Table 1
Benchmark: Key Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
Preferences
 0:952 Discount factor
 0:6 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
N 1:75 Preference parameter for leisure
F 0:02 Preference parameter for monetary assets
 0:2 Share parameter in index of money holdings
Human Capital and Crime
L; C 0:05 Depreciation rate, both types of human capital
{ 0:7 Probability, escaping apprehension
 0:258 Time-invariant, crime-specic human capital
N0 0:215 Base inv. e¢ ciency, formal human capital
C0 0:430 Base inv. e¢ ciency, crime-specic h.capital
Production
& 2:43 Elasticity of demand for intermediate goods
 0:35 Share of physical capital, intermediate goods
K 0:02 Depreciation rate, physical capital
Commercial Banks and Loans
 0:2 E¤ective collateral-loan ratio
1 0:05 Elasticity of repayment prob, collateral
1 0:05 Elasticity of repayment prob, crime rate
Lq 1:0 Interest elasticity of loan demand
q0 0:2 Base repayment probability
	0 0:815 Parameter, risk premium for loan
Central bank
 0:1 Reserve requirement ratio
$ 0:0 Degree of interest rate smoothing
1 1:5 Response of policy rate to ination deviations
2 0:2 Response of policy rate to cyclical output
Government
K 0:2 Tax rate, physical capital income
N 0:2 Tax rate, labor income
O 0:167 Gov. consumption parameter, % of GDP
P 0:0157 Spending on public order & safety, % of GDP
 1 0:1 Parameter, responsiveness to crime rate
Adjustment Cost Parameters
F 10 Price-setting
K 10 Physical capital investment
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Government Expenditure on Public Order & Safety,  
and Number of Police Personnel, 1990-2014 
IMF Government Finance Statistics;  
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS) 
Sources: 
 Red dots denote observations for Latin American economies. Note: 
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Figure 3
Temporary shock in formal human capital investment e¢ ciency, Rule versus Discretion
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Figure 4
Temporary shock in crime-specic human capital investment e¢ ciency
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Figure 5
Temporary shock in monetary policy rate-setting
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Figure 6
Temporary shock in productivity
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